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Abstract
Many people believe in extra-sensory perception, e.g. the ability to communicate with thoughts, to sense future events or locate radiation
with the help of a V-shaped piece of wood. Addressing a gap in research specifically focused on ESP beliefs, we investigated cognitive
styles and basic motivations related to these beliefs in two survey studies. The findings suggest that a propensity to use intuition is the best
predictor of ESP beliefs in terms of cognitive style. ESP belief is positively related to fear of death, and this relation is partly mediated by
fatalism, i.e. the belief that chance controls one’s life. ESP beliefs do not seem to be perceived as irreconcilable with a rational view of
reality however, they do not necessarily provide psychological protection from existential concerns. The implications of the findings in terms
of costs and benefits of these beliefs and the possibility to change them are discussed.
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The One Million Dollar Paranormal Challenge was an offer of 1 million US dollars to anyone who can demon-
strate a paranormal ability under scientific testing conditionsi. From 1964 to 2015, when the competition was
terminated, not a single person of over thousand applicants succeeded in proving their supernatural ability.
However, recent studies reveal that around two-thirds of Americans believe in psi phenomena (Rice, 2003).
ESP or “psi” refers to extra-sensory perception, i.e. phenomena as telepathy (communicating with thoughts),
psychokinesis (the ability to move objects without physical contact), precognition (the ability to predict future
events), psychometry (reading the past from an object) or dowsing (the ability to locate underground water, bur-
ied metals and gravesites using dowsing rod). The common denominator for all the phenomena in question is
that they break the fundamental scientific principles known to date (Broad, 1953). The most recent attempts to
demonstrate the reality of ESP were made by Daryl Bem (Bem, 2011), but several labs promptly attempted and
failed to replicate his findings (Galak, LeBoeuf, Nelson, & Simmons, 2012; Ritchie, Wiseman, & French, 2012).
Since they failed to stand numerous scientific tests (e.g. Enright, 1995) these phenomena are thus considered
pseudoscientific or, as other authors prefer to term this “…not empirically attested to the satisfaction of the sci-
entific establishment.” (Irwin, 2009, p. 16).
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The high prevalence of ESP beliefs, even among well-educated individuals (Rice, 2003; Wuthnow, 1978), calls
for a better understanding of their psychological determinants. In two studies we, therefore, investigated cogni-
tive and motivational determinants of ESP beliefs, more precisely which kind of cognitive style predicts these
beliefs and whether they are deeply founded in some basic existential concerns, i.e. fear of death.
ESP as a Type of Paranormal Belief
Paranormal belief is a term with very wide and varying content. The most widely used instrument for studying
paranormal beliefs (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983, also a revised version Tobacyk, 2004) has been extensively criti-
cized for grouping together different types of beliefs that have different origins and different correlates (Aarnio &
Lindeman, 2005; Lawrence, 1995; Rice, 2003; Thalbourne, 1995; Wiseman & Watt, 2004), e.g., belief in God
and other religious beliefs, beliefs in ghosts, supernatural healing, precognition, superstition etc. Although au-
thors in the field appear to agree that paranormal belief is a multidimensional phenomenon (Aarnio &
Lindeman, 2005; Irwin, 1993, 2009) the exact number and nature of the relevant dimensions are yet to be es-
tablished. However, in previous studies, factor analytical analyses have often identified a component that is re-
lated to psi or similar phenomena (e.g. Lange, Irwin, & Houran, 2000; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983).
Beliefs in ESP phenomena are interesting because they are seemingly a more “modern” form of paranormal
belief, perhaps more in line with the current worldviews, compared to more traditional forms of superstitious be-
liefs or religious beliefs. For instance, Schouten (1983) found that students espousing ESP beliefs did not ex-
press negative feelings about the influence of technology in the modern society (see also Wuthnow, 1978).
Supporting this, a recent survey conducted on a representative sample of the US public revealed that 60% of
participants expressed their belief in ESP, which makes them one of the most prevalent forms of paranormal
belief (in comparison with 33% who believe in astrology, 35% believing that extraterrestrials visited the Earth in
the past, or 24% acknowledging that they are at least somewhat superstitious; Rice, 2003; see also Irwin,
2009). Another finding illustrating the prevalence of ESP beliefs is that people tend to interpret their unusual
experiences in life in terms of psi, although in most cases it is possible to rule out this interpretation (Kennedy,
2005).
Traditionally, researchers interested in ESP came mostly from the ranks of parapsychologists and their interest
was primarily related to the issue of how belief in ESP affects performance in ESP tasks (Irwin, 2009). They
studied the sheep-goat effect, that is, the phenomenon that persons who believe in ESP (sheep) are also more
successful at tasks created to demonstrate ESP phenomena, compared to skeptics (goats) (e.g. Storm &
Thalbourne, 2005; Thalbourne, 2010). Otherwise, most of the previous research was related to paranormal be-
liefs in general, and thus have a limited applicability to ESP beliefs specifically.
In this study, we therefore decided to focus on this specific type of paranormal belief and study some of its psy-
chological foundations. A more thorough understanding of ESP beliefs has implications for the wider debate
related to personal, social and political consequences of holding and acting upon such beliefs (see also Irwin,
2009). It would also help better delineate the relations of these specific beliefs and the more general category
of paranormal belief.
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The Present Study
In this manuscript, we will present two studies. Study 1 examined whether ESP beliefs can be reliably meas-
ured and whether rational or intuitive cognitive styles are better predictors of these beliefs. Study 2 examined
the motivational foundations of ESP beliefs, in particular, their relation to fear of death and external/internal lo-
cus of control. As already argued, since research on ESP has been largely integrated within the study of para-
normal belief in general, we will start by presenting the findings from this wider framework and then discuss
whether they also apply to ESP, theoretically and (if possible) empirically.
Study 1
Theoretical Rationale
Cognitive Predictors of Paranormal Belief
Previous research suggests that socio-demographic differences account for a very small percentage of the var-
iance in paranormal belief, disproving the “deprivation theory”, i.e. the idea that poorer educational and socio-
cultural background should make individuals more susceptible to paranormal belief (Rice, 2003, cf. Haraldsson,
1981; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Wuthnow, 1978). The existent research also
failed to reveal deficits in critical reasoning ability among paranormal believers (Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005;
Roe, 1999). Portions of research suggest that it is the individual’s cognitive style, rather than cognitive ability or
education that makes the difference. A propensity for an analytical thinking style has been shown to negatively
predict paranormal belief although this link has been studied most extensively with regard to religiousness or
using the undifferentiated measures of paranormal belief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Morgan, 2016;
Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016). For instance, Pennycook and collea-
gues recently presented a meta-analytical integration of a number of studies which go to show that non-believ-
ers are more analytical and reflexive than believers (Pennycook et al., 2016). The authors argue that a propen-
sity for analytical thinking undermines religiosity and other kinds of paranormal belief because people prone to
analytical thinking are readier to critically examine culturally accepted beliefs and renounce them (Pennycook et
al., 2012, 2016).
Paranormal belief has also been related to more specific deficiencies in rational thinking, such as misperception
of chance (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Brugger, Landis, & Regard, 1990; Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, 2007)
or confusion of ontological domains (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007). However, the existent research suggests that a
lack of rationality cannot be the exclusive explanation since a large percentage of variance still remains unex-
plained (Pennycook et al., 2016; cf. Gray, 1985). Furthermore, different authors, especially developmental psy-
chologists, argue for the important role of intuitive thinking in development and maintenance of paranormal be-
lief, religious belief in particular (Boyer, 2008; Epley, Converse, Delbosc, Monteleone, & Cacioppo, 2009;
Kelemen, 2004). In line with this, intuitive cognitive style has been demonstrated to predict esoteric thinking and
superstition (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). Lindeman and Aarnio (2007) also found that intuitive
thinking was the more important predictor of superstition and paranormal belief than analytical thinking.
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Cognitive Styles and ESP Belief
A central issue of interest for the present study is whether the previous findings can be extrapolated to ESP
beliefs in particular. Similar to other paranormal belief, belief in ESP was found not to be related to the reason-
ing ability (Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005), suggesting that it is differences in cognitive style rather than cognitive
ability that are of importance. Furthermore, it has been established that better-educated individuals are in fact
more likely to endorse belief in psi (Rice, 2003). It is possible that ESP beliefs have some specific relations to
cognitive style. First, it is possible that an analytical cognitive style can be related to an interest in and espous-
ing of ESP beliefs, as an alternative to more traditional religious and superstitious ones (cf. Morgan, 2016). An-
other issue of interest is the relationship between analytic and intuitive cognitive styles. In the cited research
analytical style has most frequently been defined as the propensity to overcome highly salient intuitive solutions
to problems (Pennycook et al., 2012), and measured with the cognitive reflection task (Frederick, 2005). This
conceptualization has two tacit assumptions, namely that the two cognitive styles exclude each other and that
the preferred styles identified in a problem solving context can be generalized to other issues and domains.
However, it is possible that a person with a highly analytical cognitive style in rational problem solving would still
lean on the intuition when thinking about whether there is more to reality than we can perceive.
We, therefore, chose to investigate both intuitive and rational cognitive styles. Based on dual system models of
information processing (Evans, 2003; Kahneman, 2015; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), Pacini and Epstein (Epstein
et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) distinguish between a rational (analytical, objective, fact-oriented) mode
and an experiential (intuitive, associative, emotional) mode of information processing. The core proposition of
the model is that the two systems operate independently so that individuals can hold conflicting beliefs arising
from the two different systems (e.g. death is an irreversible ending of life / the soul continues to exist after
death). Following this distinction, belief in ESP could be more closely related to the operation of the intuitive
than the (inconsistency) of the rational system, resulting in ESP beliefs existing side-by-side with rational and
scientifically based worldviews. In the current study, we wanted to investigate whether analytical or experiential
style are significant predictors of ESP beliefs as well as which style contributes more to their prediction.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Two hundred and fifty-seven students from the Faculty of Philosophy, Faculty of Media and Communications
and Faculty of Mathematicsii in Belgrade participated in a survey study (43% female, mean age 21.94, SD =
5.74). Roughly a half of the students (58%) were administered a pen-and-paper questionnaire during classes at
the university, while the remaining participants responded online. Students participated voluntarily and signed
(clicked on) informed consent prior to answering the questionnaire.
Instruments
The questionnaire consisted of a short socio-demographic section and three scales that were counterbalanced,
to prevent any order effects.
Extra-sensory perception belief scale — was developed, which consisted of 12 items with 5-point rating
scales. We chose to examine belief in most common phenomena related to ESP: telepathy, precognition, dows-
ing and perception of causality instead of chance. The scale tapped into phenomena close to the everyday ex-
perience that could be interpreted as evidencing ESP (e.g. I believe that it is not a coincidence that when I in-
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tend to call someone, that very person calls me. Or I always feel when a close person is not feeling well, even
when we do not have direct contact). The scale showed good internal consistency (α = .85).
Principal component analysis revealed a clear unidimensional structure of this scale (detailed in Table 1). The
first principal component explained 38.7% of the variance and had high loadings (a minimum of .40) from all the
items in the scale. The second component explained additional 9.82% of the variance, and it appears to be a
more specific aspect of ESP belief, most closely related to “sensing” events or people without direct contact.
Inspection of the Scree plot suggests that the largest difference in the percentage of the explained variance is
between the first and second component (the third component explained 8.03% of variance), so we therefore
conclude that the one-factor solution is the most adequate for this scale.
Table 1
Factor Loadings for the First Principal Component Extracted From the Scale of ESP Beliefs
Item Factor loading
I believe that some people can sense future events. .747
I believe that is not a coincidence when the very person I am thinking about calls me. .741
The alleged parapsychological powers boil down to pure speculation or fraud. .717
With the help of certain instruments (as dowsing rod), people can detect sources of dangerous radiation in the house. .652
I think that the modern science has shown there is no evidence for parapsychological claims. .649
I believe it is possible for people to sense things from the domains beyond their physical senses. .625
When I guess correctly the side on which a coin will lend, I know that it is a result of pure chance. .615
I can sense when somebody is watching me from behind. .610
I believe that profilers have the ability to read the circumstances of a crime from objects. .562
Even though I do not know how, I can always feel when a close person is unwell, without any direct contact. .537
Sometimes I dream about things that later happen. .523
I do not believe that dowsing (using metal or tree V- shaped instruments) is a reliable method of detecting underground water. .409
Superstition — was measured by the scale developed in Serbian and validated by Žeželj, Pavlović,
Vladisavljević, and Radivojević (2009). This scale taps into the most frequent traditional forms of superstitious
beliefs, e.g. When somebody mentions some unfortunate event, it is good to knock on wood, for protection. Or I
never go under a ladder, even when this is more convenient for me. It has 20 items with 5-point rating scales (α
= .89).
Cognitive styles — were measured by a translated version of the 40-item Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI;
Pacini & Epstein, 1999). This inventory assesses rational and experiential styles through two dimensions: en-
gagement (motivation to use rational and intuitive thinking) and self-rated ability. Rational style is indicated by
the endorsement of items as I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people (ability) or Using
logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life (engagement). Intuitive style is indicated by
items as When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings (ability) and Intuition can be a
very useful way to solve problems (engagement).
A principal component analysis was conducted to explore the structure of the scale since we did not find any
previous report using the scale in Serbian translation. The first two components (18.11%, 16.73%) could clearly
be interpreted as experiential and rational cognitive styles, since they had loadings from all the respective items
from the scales. Scree plot suggested that the largest difference in explained variance was between the second
and the third factor (which explained 5.49% of the variance), so a two-factor solution appears to be the best
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fitted to the data. However, since the subscales suggested by the authors provided reliable measures of the
described dimensions (α = .75 for RA, .78 for RE, .82 for EA, and .78 for EE), and they offered the distinction
relevant to the current research question, we used them in the analyses to allow more precise conclusionsiii.
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables are presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Variables in Study 1
Variable M SD
Correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. ESP beliefs 2.90 .75 – .58** -.12* -.05 .32** .43**
2. Superstition 2.13 .72 – -.20* -.31** .20** .25**
3. Rational ability 3.81 .58 – .69** .14 -.09
4. Rational engagement 3.69 .69 – .12* -.05
5. Experiential ability 3.29 .68 – .69**
6. Experiential engagement 2.97 .68 –
Note. We report Spearman coefficients since the variables deviated from normal distribution.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
While there is a substantial correlation between the superstition and ESP belief scale scores, belief in ESP is
endorsed significantly more than the traditional forms of superstitious beliefs, t(243) = 16.33, p < .001.
Both types of beliefs are related to the dimensions of cognitive styles, as evidenced by the presented correla-
tions. However, it is predominantly the dimensions of the experiential rather than the rational cognitive styles
that are related to ESP beliefs. We further explored the ability of cognitive styles to predict ESP beliefs by way
of a regression analysis.
Regression analyses revealed that cognitive styles explained 20.4% of the variance in ESP beliefs and that the
best predictor was intuitiveness, more precisely the motivation to use intuition (β = .35, p < .001) (detailed in
Table 3). The self-rated rational ability was only marginally significant as a predictor (β = -.15, p = .066). In com-
parison, cognitive styles explained 16% of the variance in superstition, but the predictors that emerged signifi-
cant were different: traditional superstitious beliefs are best predicted by a lack of rational engagement (β =
-.27, p = .001) and the self-rated experiential ability (β = .20, p = .018).
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Table 3
Results From Multiple Regression Analyses in Study 1
Criterion / Predictor B SE β p
ESP
Constant 1.75 0.39 – < .001
Rational ability -0.19 0.10 -.15 .066
Rational engagement 0.06 0.08 .06 .467
Experiential ability 0.12 0.90 .10 .216
Experiential engagement 0.42 0.10 .35 < .001
Superstition
Constant 2.49 0.39 – < .001
Rational ability -0.08 0.10 -.06 .452
Rational engagement -0.29 0.08 -.27 .001
Experiential ability 0.22 0.90 .20 .018
Experiential engagement 0.10 0.10 .08 .340
Discussion
In the present study, we set out to investigate beliefs in extra-sensory perception, as one specific type of the
wider category of paranormal beliefs. We argued that, in addition to further study of the multiple dimensions of
paranormal belief and their mutual relations (Irwin, 2009), an approach focusing on specific types of these be-
liefs can be warranted. Our short scale developed to measure ESP beliefs proved a reliable and relatively unidi-
mensional instrument so we believe its further use and refinement can be recommended. To establish conver-
gent and discriminant validity of this scale, we compared it to a reliable measure of more traditional forms of
superstitious belief (Žeželj et al., 2009). We have seen that the scales do correlate to a considerable extent but
also that the average scores are higher on ESP beliefs than superstition scale, which means that these beliefs
appear to our young participants as more acceptable than the traditional ones. Importantly, superstition and
ESP beliefs showed distinct patterns of relations with the aspects of cognitive styles: while intuitive engagement
predicted ESP, a lack of rational engagement and self-rated intuitive ability predicted superstitious beliefs. We
can thus conclude that ESP beliefs are a phenomenon related to other types of paranormal belief (superstition)
but can be recognized as a distinct and seemingly more acceptable type, more in line with the modern life. A
clear limitation of the present analysis is the fact that the superstition and ESP scales have been developed
independently, so that we can observe some overlaps in their contents (e.g. related to foreseeing the future).
Future studies need to distinguish more clearly between these two dimensions, to achieve optimal discrimina-
tive validity.
Now turning to the main issue of the present study, our findings reveal that a propensity to rely on intuition is a
more important predictor of ESP belief than a lack of rationality. This is in line with some of the previous re-
search theoretically founded in the idea of rationality and intuitiveness as independent rather than contrasting
thinking styles (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007). At the same time, our findings complement previous studies that
defined a rational thinking style (more precisely, ability) as the propensity to overcome intuitive responses
(Pennycook et al., 2012). An obvious difference is that our measures relied on self-report rather than more ob-
jective assessment. It can be argued that the fact that rational ability did not emerge as a predictor of ESP de-
pends on the nature of the measure, which does not have to reflect more objective measures of ability. This
remains an issue to be addressed by future studies that should focus more specifically on ESP beliefs. Another
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interesting issue would be examining intuitive ability, however, this appears to be a much more elusive con-
struct, difficult to conceptualize and measure objectively.
Our findings thus lend support to a relative independence of intuitive and rational cognitive styles, both structur-
ally (in terms of principal components) and functionally (as predictors of different types of beliefs). Apparently,
ESP belief can exist side by side with rational and scientific worldviews within the same individual. This could
be either because some individuals do not acknowledge a sharp dividing line between these worldviews or,
quite contrary, that they do recognize this division and keep their intuitive approach for the domains other than
science. As an example of the former stance, we can consider Daryl Bem, the scientist we mentioned earlier in
this paper. He is at the same time an enthusiastic proponent of parapsychological research and a scientist who
adheres to stringent scientific principles of research. An example of the second stance is the approach called
NOMA (Non-overlapping magisteria; Gould, 1997) advocating treating science and religion as independent
fields – science as providing facts and religion as the domain of morality, values and meaning. Future studies
should investigate how and why individuals choose to combine this seemingly opposite views. Perhaps these
worldviews fulfill different psychological needs of the individual. In the following study, we will focus on some of
these needs and motives.
Study 2
Theoretical Rationale
The Motivational Underpinnings of Paranormal Belief
The ubiquity of paranormal beliefs opens up the question of whether they could have some important psycho-
logical functions, i.e. serve some basic psychological needs. Existential motives have been proposed as basic
motivations of paranormal belief, i.e. the need for meaning in life, for overcoming uncertainty, establishing (an
illusion of) control or diminishing fear of death (Irwin, 1993, 2009; Kennedy, 2005). A frequent motivational ac-
count of paranormal belief is that it is primarily motivated by a desire to achieve control over the unusual or
uncertain aspects of life (Irwin, 1993). For instance, Rudski and Edwards (2007) examined the use of supersti-
tious rituals in the everyday life of students and concluded that these rituals mostly occur in uncertain situa-
tions, thus providing the students with an illusion of control and a way of coping. Following the same basic idea,
an interesting study of the occurrence of psychological papers examining parapsychology through several dec-
ades (from 1929 to 1977) found that unfavorable social conditions (expressed through both subjective and ob-
jective indicators) predicted scientific interest in parapsychology (McCann & Stewin, 1984). Previous findings
also suggest a relation between paranormal belief and the external locus of control, i.e. the tendency to ascribe
events in one’s life to external forces (Dag, 1999; Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Tobacyk & Tobacyk, 1992),
although this was not demonstrated for the psi-subscale of the general paranormal belief (e.g. Groth-Marnat &
Pegden, 1998).
Previous research also established a link between paranormal belief and death anxiety (Irwin, 1993), however,
there is still controversy as to whether this relationship is positive or negative. In an experimental study, it was
found that making thoughts about personal mortality salient lead participants to report more belief in superna-
tural agents, coming from both one’s own and other religions, as well as a strengthened belief in divine inter-
vention (Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006). From the opposite perspective, Kennedy and Kanthamani (1995) found
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that participants who thought they had paranormal and/or transcendent experiences reported a stronger belief
in life after death, belief in a higher power and sense of purpose in life as well as decreased fear of death. The
authors, however, did not clearly distinguish what they termed paranormal and transcendent experiences and in
particular transcendent experiences appear to be defined circularly, so that the effects of the experience cannot
be delineated from the experience itself (see p. 251).
Motivations Underlying ESP Beliefs
In this study, we chose to focus on the relation of ESP beliefs with death anxiety and the locus of control, as
representative of the most common underlying motivations suggested by previous research. Theoretically, it
can be argued that these motivations are also relevant for ESP belief, that is, that ESP is motivated by a desire
to better control one’s environment and reduce some basic anxieties. What is more, since death is one of the
ultimately non-controllable aspects of life, need for control and fear of death appear to be related. This proposi-
tion has received empirical support from other domains of research. In one study (Fritsche, Jonas, &
Fankhänel, 2008) the authors showed that death anxiety can be diminished when participants are induced to
perceive some level of personal control over the circumstances of the process of dying as opposed to those
who did not. These findings suggest that the need for control could be one of the crucial components of death
anxiety.
Contrary to more traditional superstitious and religious beliefs, Davies and Kirkby (1985) show that belief in psi
is related to an internal locus of control, at least regarding personal and interpersonal spheres. Irwin (2000) also
found that a component he interpreted as psi beliefs may be related to a heightened desire for control and a
conviction that one has the means to control the events in the sociopolitical arena. The latter finding is difficult
to interpret, so the author suggests its further validation. It is apparent from this short review that the relation
between the locus of control and ESP belief needs further investigation with more focused and reliable meas-
ures.
However, it is questionable whether belief in psi can offer psychological certainty one strives for. Some studies
suggest that potentially protective function of paranormal belief in facing existential uncertainties and fears
could be limited to religious beliefs. In line with this, Tobacyk and Pirttilä-Backman (1992) found a positive cor-
relation between death anxiety and the dimension of paranormal belief related to psi, at least among their Fin-
nish participants. Wong (2009) proposes a sort of a vicious circle of superstition and anxiety in which anxiety
leads to superstition, which cannot relieve the anxiety, thus leading to it becoming even more intensive, which
in turn leads to more superstition and so on. This reasoning might also be applicable to ESP belief. Psi phe-
nomena suggest a certain alternative perspective on reality and it has been shown that people tend to explain
their unusual experiences in terms of psi (Kennedy, 2005). However, this is not comparable to the sort of more
organized worldviews as religion, with clear values and standards of behavior, and coming with a promise of
literal immortality. Therefore, these beliefs might not offer sufficient comfort in facing basic anxiety.
Based on these combined insights, we wanted to test the idea that ESP beliefs are related to basic existential
anxieties, more precisely to the individual’s chronic level of fear of death. Based on previous research suggest-
ing that control is one of the most important aspects of death anxiety (Fritsche et al., 2008), we also wanted to
examine whether the locus of control would mediate this relationship, that is, whether a tendency to attribute
outcomes in one’s life to chance would mediate the relationship between fear of death and ESP beliefs.
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We expect that fatalism should mediate the effect of fear of death on ESP beliefs, since fear of death is pro-
posed to be the basic existential concern, which shapes the way in which a person perceives the environment
(Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997). If fear of death gives rise to a need to control the environment
and perceive it as less uncertain, fatalism could be one of possible responses or paths through which some
people deal with this basic fear (e.g. believing in destiny alleviates at least some of the fear in dealing with the
uncertain future). However, it is also possible that people more prone to fatalism experience more fear of death,
which, in turn, motivates them to seek to believe in something “more” that is out there (e.g. psi phenomena).
Therefore, we will also test this alternative mediation model (from fatalism, through fear of death, to ESP be-
liefs).
Method
Participants and Procedure
Two hundred and twenty students from the Faculty of Media and Communications, Faculty of Philosophy and
Faculty of Mathematics in Belgradeiv were surveyed (66.8% female, mean age 21.34, SD = 3.49). The surveys
were administered during classes at the university. Participants read and signed informed consent prior to par-
ticipation. They were thanked and provided with either oral or written debriefing.
Instruments
ESP beliefs — were assessed using the scale described in the previous study (α = .83). Principal component
analysis suggested a single-factor solution, with almost the exact same percentage of explained variance as in
Study 1 (38.64%).
Fear of death — was measured by the 28-item Collet-Lester Fear of Death Scale (Lester & Abdel-Khalek,
2003) (α = .92). The scale was translated for the purposes of the present study by two independent translators,
while the final formulations were agreed upon through discussion. No substantial change was made in compari-
son to the original item wording. Participants indicated the degree to which they found different aspects of
death and the process of dying troubling, on a 5-point rating scales. According to the authors, the scale con-
sists of four subscales: own death, own dying, death of (close) others and dying of (close) others. A principal
component analysis was performed to explore the structure of the scale. The first component explained the
largest proportion of variance (32.85%) and had high loadings (> .46) from all the items included in the scale.
Also, the largest difference in the percentage of the explained variance was between the first and the second
component (second component explained 9.58%, third component 6.59%), suggesting a one-factor solution.
We thus computed a total score indicating the level of fear of death.
Locus of control — was measured by the multi-dimensional IPC (Internality, Powerful Others, and Chance
Scales) (Levenson, 1981), a 24-item instrument with 6-point rating scales, ranging from -3 (do not agree at all)
to +3 (fully agree). This scale was intended to offer a more differentiated measure of locus of control, an individ-
ual’s chronic tendency to interpret the events in his or her life as mostly dependent on the individual him- or
herself (internal locus) or dependent on external factors, such as chance (fatalism) or the will of powerful oth-
ers. A principal component analysis suggested that the first extracted component explained the largest percent-
age of variance (25.59%) while the second and the third component explained 10.40% and 7.40% of variance,
respectively. Factor loadings suggest that there is a common, bi-polar dimension, underlying this construct.
However, since the previous research highlights the role of the perception of chance or fatalism as a specifically
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important determinant of paranormal belief, we computed the scores for the three subscales, internality (α
= .68)v, powerful others (α = .84), and chance/fatalism (α = .73), according to the original instruction (Levenson,
1981) and divided the sums with the number of items.
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables are presented in Table 4.
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Variables in Study 2
Variable M SD
Correlations
1 2 3 4 5
1. ESP beliefs 3.09 .76 – .28** .05 .29** -.03
2. Fear of death 3.40 .73 – .16** .33** -.12*
3. IPS powerful others 1.41 .91 – .43** -.42**
4. IPS fatalism 2.51 .98 – -.29**
5. IPS internal 1.93 .63 –
Note. We report Spearman coefficients since the variables deviated from normal distribution.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
As can be seen from the table, belief in ESP was positively related to fear of death and the dimension of the
external locus of control related to the perception of chance / fatalism, but not to the dimension of powerful oth-
ers or internality. Also, fear of death was positively related to fatalism as well as the other external dimension of
“powerful others” while being negatively related to internal locus of control, in line with previous research relat-
ing fear of death to a lowered sense of control (Fritsche et al., 2008).
We further explored the relations among the variables using PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Since
only the fatalism subscale correlated with ESP beliefs, we entered this variable in the mediation analysis. Medi-
ation analysis showed that fear of death and IPS fatalism subscale explained 12% of the variance in ESP belief
scores, F(209, 2) = 14.07, p < .001, (Figure 1). Death fear had both a direct (b = .22, SE = .07, 95% CI
[.07, .36]) and an indirect effect on ESP beliefs, that is, this relation was partially mediated by the tendency to
attribute events to chance (b = .08, SE = .03, 95% CI [.03, .15]).
Figure 1. Relations between ESP beliefs, fatalism and fear of death.
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We also tested the alternative model, in which fatalism is entered as the predictor and fear of death as the me-
diator. This model also showed partial mediation, however, the effect sizes were slightly smaller compared to
the previous model: the direct path from fatalism to ESP (b = .16, SE = .05, 95% CI [.06, .27]), and the indirect
path through fear of death (b = .06, SE = .02, 95% CI [.02, .10]).
Discussion
In this study, we addressed some important motives underlying ESP beliefs. We established a positive relation
of ESP belief with death anxiety as well as the propensity to attribute events in life to chance. Moreover, fatal-
ism partially mediated the effects of death anxiety on ESP. The findings are in line with the rare studies that
investigated the relationship between fear of death and forms of paranormal belief other than religious (Tobacyk
& Pirttilä-Backman, 1992; Wong, 2009). These findings need to be distinguished from those related to more
traditional religious beliefs that have typically exhibited a negative relation with death anxiety (e.g. Tobacyk &
Pirttilä-Backman, 1992; Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006).
The present findings speak to the conclusion that ESP beliefs are at least partly driven by some fundamental
existential concerns, as facing the uncertainty of existence and death. A relevant theoretical framework to un-
derstand this relation is offered by terror management theory (TMT; TMT, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon,
1986; Pyszczynski et al., 1997; Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2015; Solomon, Greenberg, &
Pyszczynski, 2004). This theory posits that simple defense mechanisms as negation or rationalization do not
suffice to avert fear arising from the awareness of mortality and that people, therefore, need to lean on more
elaborate symbolic defenses. Complex cultural worldviews are potent enough to offer solace and a hope of in-
dividual transcendence to people who espouse them and strive to attain self-esteem within the standards they
define. Religion has a particular importance as a defensive structure, owing to its direct relation with the prom-
ise of afterlife and immortality (Vail et al., 2010). For instance, it has been shown that offering proof of literal
immortality (existence of an afterlife) buffers other defensive reactions to mortality reminders (Dechesne et al.,
2003).
A similar logic can be extended to the role of ESP beliefs, as a sort of belief in invisible forces that speak about
a reality that is beyond our senses or reason. From terror management perspective, the allure of such beliefs
can be explained by the desire for transcending the limitations of the mortal self. However, since these beliefs
are only loosely related to a sense of an afterlife or supernatural agents, they could not be as effective a de-
fense as the more traditional religious beliefs. Thus, they could be driven by similar motivation but not offer the
same kind of psychological protection. Since the data at hand are correlational, the exact causal pathways are
not possible to establish: one the one hand, it makes sense that more fear creates more need to believe in ESP
(among other things); on the other, stronger belief could also lead to more fear, which is at least partly consis-
tent with some previous studies including people who had unusual experiences (Kennedy & Kanthamani,
1995). Moreover, both directions could, in fact, combine and result in what Wong (2009) describes a vicious
circle of anxiety creating more belief, which, in turns, does not succeed in relieving the anxiety.
As the relation between ESP beliefs and fear of death was partly mediated by fatalism, i.e. belief that chance
controls one’s outcomes in life, this appears to be one of the relevant concerns addressed by these beliefs. The
less one feels one can control the events in life and environment, the more alluring do ESP beliefs become as
at least some kind of framework for understanding reality. The present results are thus consistent with previous
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research relating at paranormal belief with the need for control (Irwin, 1993, 2000; Rudski & Edwards, 2007), as
well as the external locus of control (Dag, 1999; Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Tobacyk & Tobacyk, 1992). The
present findings further specify this locus, as well as its relations with other basic motivations. As mentioned,
the exact nature of relations between fear of death and fatalism as determinants of ESP belief needs further,
preferably experimental, research.
The findings are also in line with the studies done by Fritsche and colleagues (2008), showing that a need for
control can underlie fear of death. However, since the mediation we established was only partial, there appear
to be other relevant aspects of death fear as a basic motivation for ESP. They could also address the need for
meaning in life, in suggesting the possibility that there is a wider or a transcendent reality beyond ours. This
potential source of motivation should be explored in future studies.
General Discussion
As the two studies reveal, ESP beliefs can be conceptualized and measured as a coherent and a relatively dis-
tinct set of paranormal beliefs. These beliefs appear to be more strongly related to an intuitive cognitive style
than (a lack of) rationality. In line with the dual-process models of information-processing, these beliefs are thus
not irreconcilable with a rational worldview, rendering the well-educated individuals susceptible or even particu-
larly inclined to them (Pennycook et al., 2012; Rice, 2003). The findings related to the motivational underpin-
nings of these beliefs suggest that these beliefs have some very basic motivational foundations and also that
their psychological role can be ambivalent (Wong, 2009). Apparently, ESP beliefs could be traced back to a
psychological need to account for some aspects of reality that one cannot readily understand or control and
perhaps an expression of the fear of the unknown. With this initial study, we hope to contribute to a more fo-
cused and elaborate study of this specific type of paranormal belief, as a complementary approach to the study
of the multidimensionality of paranormal belief in general (Irwin, 2009).
A reader of literature on ESP phenomena gets easily struck by a certain duality in research that could be traced
back to whether the researchers are skeptics or believers (e.g. Irwin, 2009; Kennedy, 2005). We can concur
with that ESP belief can be studied regardless of whether one thinks ESP phenomena actually exist (Irwin,
2009). However, there are two inevitably controversial issues that we would like to briefly touch upon: the costs
and benefits of ESP beliefs, and, relatedly, the possibility to change them.
As regards the costs and benefits of holding ESP beliefs, one important aspect is their consequences for indi-
vidual well-being. Whether or not ESP phenomena are real, people might experience consolation or a sense of
meaning believing in them – along the lines of the literature supporting the utility of illusions (e.g. illusion of con-
trol, Langer, 1975; Taylor & Brown, 1988, 1994). The research on this is still scarce and without conclusive evi-
dence. We have mentioned one study in particular that explored the effects of the (self-reported) unusual expe-
riences (Kennedy & Kanthamani, 1995) and concluded these effects are predominantly positive – related to a
heightened sense of meaning, belief in an afterlife and supernatural agents. However, these positive effects
were not reported by each individual and, furthermore, 45% of participants also reported that these experiences
caused fear. The current findings are consistent with those less favorable outcomes: ESP beliefs can arise from
a need for more certainty and control but fail to offer it. More research is clearly needed to support (or refute)
this. Another important aspect of the costs-and-benefits issue is the wider socio-political consequences. Al-
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though ESP beliefs in their own might appear more intimate and less related to the political realm, they could
also acquire more societal provenance. This could happen in particular under conditions of social unrest and
uncertainty, as evidenced, for instance, by a proliferation of seers and magical healers in Serbia in the turbulent
decade of nineties. In such circumstances, these beliefs and resulting behaviors can easily be manipulated to-
wards political motives and aims, for instance providing alternative (e.g. supernatural) explanations for the cur-
rent social events.
The second issue is the stability or, put differently, the possibility to change ESP beliefs. This is a clearly contro-
versial issue for the parapsychologists, which would claim there is no need to change them and that the main-
stream scientists should consider changing their dogmatic skepticial views (Kennedy, 2005). Although there is a
possibility that skepticism can outgrow its own benefit (Blackmore, 1992) one can certainly hold that acting on
any belief that defies rational reflection or scrutiny might become problematic, both for individual and for the
society. The present findings do speak to the relative stability of the ESP in that they a. are not reducible to a
deficit in reasoning that can easily be unlearned, b. have some basic motivational foundations. The previous
attempts to educate students into a more critical stance towards paranormal claims have had at least some
short-term favorable effects in developing more skepticism (Banziger, 1983; Gray, 1985; Manza et al., 2010).
Such efforts might also benefit from an open discussion of the motives and needs that these beliefs fulfill, with
the expectation that achieving insight into one’s beliefs would make a person more reflective and less uncritical-
ly attached to them. This expectation should be tested experimentally.
Limitations of the Present Study and Suggestions for Further Investigations
The present studies have important limitations. As they were correlational in design, they do not allow drawing
any causal conclusions and further experimental studies are needed to more clearly establish these. Also, the
present studies revealed only some of the important determinants of ESP beliefs, and future studies should in-
clude other variables. Other determinants might be related to the social context, both wider socio-political con-
texts (McCann & Stewin, 1984) as well as more immediate interpersonal context (Markovsky & Thye, 2001).
For instance, participants were more likely to express belief in the energy of a pyramid vs. an ordinary shaped
cardboard box to preserve the freshness of fruit when other people also expressed it (Markovsky & Thye,
2001).
The issue of cross-cultural specificity of paranormal belief has yet to be addressed thoroughly, although some
of the initial studies do suggest a degree of cultural specificity (Tobacyk & Pirttilä-Backman, 1992; Tobacyk &
Tobacyk, 1992). The present studies are also interesting in that they study ESP beliefs in a specific socio-cul-
tural setting, one characterized by high and rising levels of religiosity (Blagojević, 2013; Dušanić, 2007). There-
fore, it might be interesting to study ESP beliefs in relation to religious beliefs and identification in future studies.
With these initial studies, we hope to have contributed to understanding of the psychological bases of ESP be-
lief, as a specific and a highly prevalent form of paranormal belief in the contemporary society.
Notes
i) This was offered by James Randi Educational Foundation https://web.randi.org/
ii) Of the total sample, 114 were students of archeology, 107 students of psychology and 36 students of programming.
iii) The ability and engagement subscales within both experiential and rational styles did correlate highly, but this did not
lead to multicollinearity issues, as evidenced by the relevant indices (tolerance statistics ranged between .47 and .53).
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iv) There were a total of 134 psychology students, 62 archeology students and 23 students of programming. A non-
parametric median comparison did not reveal significant differences in the level of ESP beliefs among students from
different fields. Also, exclusion of the students of programming from the sample did not change the findings. We therefore
report the analyses conducted on the whole sample.
v) One item was removed that did not correlate with the total score (The number of friends I have depends on the kind of
person I am.), to achieve sufficient reliability.
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